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Abstract
In this thesis, we empirically analyze the effects of exchange rate policy on exter-
nal debt accumulation in emerging market economies with a sample of 15 countries
over the period 1998-2010. The exchange rate policy is captured by the de facto
exchange rate classification of Ilzetzki, Reinhart, and Rogoff (2008). This classifica-
tion is based on the actual exchange rate behavior rather than the officially declared
regimes. Therefore, it is expected to better reflect the exchange rate policies actu-
ally followed by the countries. In the baseline regression, we find that fixed exchange
rate regimes have a significantly negative effect on debt accumulation compared to
flexible regimes while intermediate regimes do not have a significant effect. When
we separate the intermediate flexibility group into two, we see that a lower level
of flexibility leads to a positive effect on debt accumulation, while a higher level of
flexibility still does not a have significant effect relative to full flexibility. However,
this result is mostly driven by Argentina in the sample. When we look at the effect
of periods in which there is a transition in exchange rate policy, we observe that
these periods have a significantly positive effect on debt accumulation. Our results
are robust to several tests.
v
GELI˙S¸MEKTE OLAN U¨LKELERDE DO¨VI˙Z KURU REJI˙MI˙ POLI˙TI˙KALARI
VE DIS¸ BORC¸: AMPI˙RI˙K BI˙R C¸ALIS¸MA
Bilgen CEBI˙R
Ekonomi, Yu¨ksek Lisans Tezi, 2012
Tez Danıs¸manı: I˙nci GU¨MU¨S¸
Anahtar Kelimeler: fiili do¨viz kurları, dıs¸ borc¸, gelis¸mekte olan ekonomiler.
O¨zet
Bu c¸alıs¸mada, gelis¸mekte olan u¨lkelerde do¨viz kuru politikalarının dıs¸ borc¸ birikimi
u¨zerine olan etkisini inceledik. Kullanılan veri seti 15 u¨lkeden olus¸up, 1998 ve
2010 yılları arasını kapsamaktadır. Do¨viz kuru politikası Ilzetzki, Reinhart ve Ro-
goff (2008) fiili do¨viz kuru sınıflandırması kullanılarak modele yerles¸tirilmis¸tir. Bu
sınıflandırma, u¨lkelerin resmi ac¸ıklamalarından ziyade fiili davranıs¸ları go¨z o¨nu¨nde
bulundurularak olus¸turulmus¸ bir sınıflandırmadır. Bu nedenle, u¨lkelerin takip ettig˘i
do¨viz kuru politikalarını daha iyi yansıtması beklenmektedir. Temel model regresy-
onunda, sabit kur rejimlerinin gelis¸mekte olan u¨lkelerde dıs¸ borc¸ birikimini negatif
yo¨nde etkilerken, ara rejimlerin esnek kurlara go¨re istatistiksel bir farklılık yarat-
madıg˘ını go¨rdu¨k. Ara rejim grubunu ikiye ayırdıg˘ımızda, sabit kur rejimlerinin
borc¸ birikimini negatif etkilemeye devam ederken, ilk grup ara rejimlerin pozitif
etkiledig˘ini, ikinci grubun ise esnek kur rejimlerine go¨re istatistiksel bir farklılık
yaratmadıg˘ını go¨rdu¨k. Ancak bu sonuc¸ bu¨yu¨k o¨lc¸ekte Arjantin’den kaynaklanmak-
tadır. Gec¸is¸ do¨nemlerine ayrı bir deg˘is¸kenle baktıg˘ımızda ise, gec¸is¸ do¨nemlerinin borc¸
birikimini pozitif yo¨nde etkiledig˘ini go¨rdu¨k. Sonuc¸larımız, c¸es¸itli sag˘lamlık testleriyle
de tutarlı sonuc¸lar vermektedir.
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1 Introduction
The choice of exchange rate regime has been a debatable issue for many years,
especially after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system. Although it is possible
to find some common results about the structure, advantages, or disadvantages of
different exchange rate regimes in the literature; the discussion has not ended and
it seems that it will continue in the future since many new theoretical perspectives
and empirical studies are emerging every day.
Why is the exchange rate so important? First of all, it is the most important
“price” in international finance as it affects both trade flows and financial flows.
Its movements have a signaling effect on international markets about the financial
state of the economy. It conveys information on monetary policy conduct and af-
fects expectations about macroeconomic stability. Since it is an important economic
variable, it holds an important place in the literature. However, the literature has
mainly focused on the impact of exchange rates on inflation, growth and economic
crises throughout the time after the Bretton Woods system collapsed. A few studies
on the relationship between exchange rates and risk premia also exist in the literature
but much less than the ones on inflation, growth, or crises. The relation between
exchange rate policy and external debt, on the other hand, has not been studied ex-
tensively up to now. The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the effects of exchange
rate policy on external debt accumulation in emerging market economies.
The importance of the subject comes from the fact that, especially for small
economies, it is not possible to borrow in their own currencies in international finan-
cial markets (the “original sin” hypothesis proposed by Barry Eichengreen, Ricardo
Hausmann and Ugo Panizza in a series of papers at the beginning of 2000s). As the
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results of the comparative research between core and periphery countries of pre-First
World War period conducted by Bordo and Flandreau (2003) suggest, core countries
were financially mature and therefore they were able to borrow in their own currency
in international markets, so they could allow their currencies to float. On the other
hand, peripheral countries did not have mature financial systems, so they were not
be able to borrow in their own currencies at international arena which led to the
preference of fixed regimes by those countries at that period. The strong link found
by Bordo and Flandreau (2003) underlies the importance of analyzing the effect of
exchange rate regime choice on debt accumulation. This thesis tries to find an em-
pirical result for this question for emerging economies given the constraint with the
access to the necessary data.
The general arguments about the advantages and disadvantages of fixed or flexible
exchange rate regimes can be summarized as follows: Fixed exchange rates provide
better “discipline” on the policymakers to prevent continuing inflation. From the
policy effectiveness perspective, as commonly known, fiscal policy is more effective
under fixed rates in affecting the national income in case of mobile short-term capital
flow. With fixed exchange rate regimes, there will be no wasteful resource allocations
with continuously changing tradable sectors stemming from the substantial move-
ments in exchange rates. On the other hand, in part of flexible rates, high inflation
can actually be seen a “signal” of poor macroeconomic policy performance and it
is questionable to provide such a “discipline” provided by fixed regimes by ignoring
the other macroeconomic goals such as maintaining a low level of unemployment
and a high level of output growth. Monetary policy is more effective under flexible
rates regardless of the degree of the international capital mobility and international
reserves do not face a risk to be exhausted quickly. In far as we are concerned with
the resource allocation, flexible rates allow to move one of the most important prices
of the economy freely, i.e., the exchange rate, while fixing it can cause itself an in-
efficient resource allocation. The arguments can be ongoing in similar ways, those
above are the main, commonly known ones and they are given place here just to
remind them briefly.
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Exchange rate regime options for a country lie on a spectrum from pure flexibil-
ity to pure rigidity. The exchange rate regimes declared by countries are grouped
into eight categories according to the IMF de jure classification, starting from the
“currency union” at one extreme to “pure float” at the other. This de jure clas-
sification reflects what countries say or officially declare about their exchange rate
regime policies. Nonetheless, a new kind of classification has emerged since the of-
ficially declared regimes do not always reflect the actual exchange rate behavior.
The classifications based on observed movements of the exchange rate are called de
facto classifications. There are many attempts to construct the most realistic de
facto classification by many authors; in this thesis, the classification of Reinhart and
Rogoff (2004) is used, and more information is given in the third section.
The exchange rate regime choice issue has especially gained attention for underde-
veloped or emerging economies at recent times due to the currency crises witnessed
by them through the last 10-20 years. For developed economies, there is a clear
picture about exchange rate regime; to be more clear, they tend to choose “flexibil-
ity” unless they are in a monetary union (like EMU). However, the picture is still
less obvious for emerging economies. The debate has been going on about what
these economies will do in the future; which kind of regime is suitable for their
macroeconomic performance; or, whether they will only tend to the extreme cases
of flexibility or rigidity by moving away from the intermediate regimes as proposed
in the “hollowing-out hypothesis” or “bipolar view”1.
We investigate the relation between external debt and exchange rate regime pol-
icy for this reason. Since there is no clear picture for emerging economies, we want
to see the different effects of a vast spectrum of exchange rate policies on the debt
accumulation process. Since emerging economies generally borrow in terms of foreign
currencies, exchange rate regime is expected to have a direct effect on debt accu-
mulation through affecting its nominal value at first stage. On the other hand, it
1Countries will tend to the polar extremes of exchange rate regimes - they will choose either
hard pegs or poor floating and intermediate regimes will eventually disappear (Eichengreen (1994),
Fischer (2001) and Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995)).
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affects other macroeconomic variables like real GDP growth, inflation, interest rate
movements, or financial inflows and through its effects on these variables, it may
affect the external debt through a secondary mechanism. Different exchange rate
regimes may lead to different forms of capital flow to the economy, and this may
also affect the debt accumulation process of the country. In addition, exchange rate
regime affects the borrowing incentives of economic agents of the economy such as the
government or the banking sector. For example, with a fixed exchange rate regime,
the government cannot use seigniorage as a source of revenue and this may create
an incentive for more borrowing. Moreover, fixed rates may increase the borrowing
incentives of the private sector by decreasing the uncertainty about the exchange
rate in the economy. On the other hand, a high level of external debt may increase
the susceptibility to an economic crisis, in a fixed exchange rate regime; so this may
create a disincentive for more borrowing. Which mechanism will dominate the other
and determine the borrowing behavior of the economy is a question that may be
answered through an empirical analysis.
We conduct our empirical analysis with 15 countries over the period 1998-2010.
The data are obtained on a quarterly basis. Panel data-fixed effects regression anal-
ysis is used. We include the lag of real GDP growth rate, inflation rate, financial
openness, investment over GDP and the lag of sovereign spreads in the baseline
model as explanatory variables to control for their effects. The main results of the
thesis are as follows: Fixed exchange rate regimes have a negative effect on external
debt accumulation relative to flexible regimes in the baseline model. This finding
may be the result of the following: Fixed regimes prevent large devaluations, so the
nominal value of the debt is protected. In addition, if they fix the macroeconomic
balances by reducing inflation and providing fiscal discipline, they may decrease the
need for borrowing. Or, fixed regimes may change the form of capital inflow; for
example, they may lead to more foreign direct investment by increased stability and
trust in the economy rather than short-term capital flows. The intermediate regime
dummy has a positive coefficient although it is statistically insignificant which shows
that choosing an intermediate regime does not make a difference relative to flexible
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regimes. On the other hand, in the first extension of the baseline model, when we
look at the effects of two separate intermediate regime categories instead of one, we
see that first group of intermediate regimes has a positive effect on debt accumulation
while the second group makes no difference relative to flexible rates again. However,
this result is mostly driven by Argentina in the sample. When we exclude Argentina
from the sample, we see that this result weakens: The positive coefficient reduces in
magnitude as well as its statistical significance decreases. Moreover, when we look
at the effect of periods in which there is a transition in exchange rate policy, we
observe that these periods have a significantly positive effect on debt accumulation.
Finally, currency crises have a positive effect on debt accumulation but when cur-
rency crises, banking and debt crises are all taken into account together, we cannot
see a significant effect. Our results seem to be robust to several tests which will be
explained in detail in the fourth section.
5
2 Literature Review
The choice of exchange rate regime has been a debatable issue in the literature of
international economics. An extensive literature exists related with this issue from
different perspectives. For years, the literature has mainly focused on the effect of
the exchange rate regime on inflation or growth as the macroeconomic performance
indication. For many emerging economies, the exchange rate has been an important
tool to stabilize the inflation rate until the end of 1990s. On the other hand, this
has led to the investigation of the growth performance of these economies by many
economists.
Ghosh, Gulde, and Wolf (2002) makes a detailed empirical analysis based on a
comprehensive data set of IMF member countries and reach quite important conclu-
sions related with inflation and growth, to count a few: First of all, pegged exchange
rate regimes have a better inflation performance with respect to the floating regimes
which is an important benefit for most of the emerging economies. Secondly, they
find no strong evidence that pegged regimes have a better growth performance.
Thirdly, output is more volatile under fixed regimes. And, lastly, pegged exchange
rate regimes are more likely to confront a currency crisis, not a banking crisis.(See
also Ghosh, Gulde, Ostry, and Wolf (1997)).
Bailliu, Lafrance, and Perrault (2003) conducts an empirical analysis using a
panel data of 60 countries over the 1973-98 period. Their study shows that all
exchange rate regimes characterized by a monetary policy anchor have a positive
effect on growth, but in case of without a policy anchor, intermediate and flexible
rates have a negative effect. So, they reach a conclusion that presence of monetary
policy anchor is the determining factor rather than the exchange rate regime itself.
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Bleaney and Francisco (2007) paper is another example investigating the effect
of exchange rate regimes on inflation and growth by using the data for 91 developing
countries over the period 1984-2001. Their econometric analysis for four types of
different exchange rate regime classification suggests that growth rates (growth in
per capita terms) in developing countries under soft pegs and floats are similar, and
inflation rates are also close for three of the four regime schemes; however, hard pegs
produce lower inflation and slower growth when compared with other regimes.
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2001) and Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003)
have remarkable results related with this issue. In Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger
(2001), they use a sample of 154 countries covering the period 1974-1999. By using
the Levy-Yeyati-Sturzenegger(LYS) type of de facto classification of exchange rate
regimes, they conduct their empirical analysis and find that there is no significant
link between regimes and economic performance for industrial countries while for
non-industrial economies, there is a robust relationship between fixed regimes and
lower inflation only in case of long pegs. Short pegs perform slower growth as well as
poor gain in inflation. In Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003), the data cover 183
countries over 1974-2000 period. This paper also supports the finding of previous
paper.
Rogoff, Husain, Mody, Brooks, and Oomes (2003) finds no support for the bipo-
lar view( countries will tend to move to the polar extremes of exchange rate regimes
(either pure float or rigid peg) over time). In addition, their study supports the
idea that economies which are at their early stage of financial development and inte-
gration, fixed or relatively rigid regimes have some advantage to gain anti-inflation
credibility without a significant sacrifice of growth. The more economies mature,
the more valuable flexibility becomes (Husain, Mody, and Rogoff (2005) have very
similar results also)1.
In summary, fixed exchange rates give advantage of lowering inflation but lead
to a relatively slower growth rate and more volatile output with respect to flexible
1One more study of this literature: De Grauwe and Schnabl (2005) analyzes the impact of
exchange rate regime on inflation and output in Southern and Central Europe.
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rates in emerging economies. For advanced economies, the choice of exchange rate
regime is not as much important as in the emerging economies but floating brings
more advantage about growth rate.
On the other hand, the impact of exchange rate regimes on the risk premia is
rather a new subject in the literature; Janjah and Yue (2004), Barajas, Erickson,
and Steiner (2008), and Gumus (2011) are studies of this literature.
Janjah and Yue (2004) use de facto classification of exchange rate regimes and
real exchange rate misalignment to capture the exchange rate policy. Their main
findings indicate that the real exchange rate overvaluation leads to more debt is-
suing.Thus, the probability of sovereign bond issuing increases. However, the debt
sustainability is deteriorated in case of the depreciation risk associated with over-
valued real exchange rates; therefore, bond spreads increase especially under hard
pegs. On the other hand, borrowing becomes more costly for countries with floating
regimes in crises periods; therefore, hard-peg regimes have an advantage over floating
regimes in those periods due to the lower spreads.
Barajas, Erickson, and Steiner (2008) use a de jure exchange rate classification
and analyze the effects of de jure regime choice on sovereign spreads. In addition,
they analyze the effects of the actual degree of intervention into the exchange rate
market on the spreads by using an intervention index they construct. Their results
basically suggest that spreads tend to be lower in countries with fixed exchange rate
regimes no matter it is in de jure or de facto terms. Also, there is no punishment of
intervention, because exchange rate intervention leads to lower spreads as well.
Gumus (2011) analyzes the relationship between exchange rate regime policy and
sovereign risk premia in emerging market economies empirically. She uses both the
de jure and de facto classification of exchange rate regimes to see the difference
of results when countries deviate from what they officially declare. The conclusion
of the paper is that floating regimes and pegged regimes face similar spreads but
intermediate regimes face higher spreads. In de jure analysis, she founds that pegged
rates are more advantageous than the intermediate and floating regimes.
The paper most closely related with the subject of this thesis is Alper and Yilmaz
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(2003). The authors particularly emphasizes the point that the literature should
focus on the role of exchange rate regimes in the accumulation of external debt
in emerging markets in the post-capital account liberalization era, especially after
the recent crises emerged in these economies like Argentina and Turkey, instead of
elaborating on the growth or inflation issue. In the econometric analysis of the paper,
panel data for 57 countries from 1975 to 2000 are used to analyze the relationship
between exchange rate regimes and debt accumulation. As the exchange rate regime
classification, LYS type of de facto classification of exchange rate regimes is used.
An unbalanced panel regression analysis is conducted due to the fact that not all
countries have data for every year from 1975 to 2000. The dependent variable is
chosen as DebtBurdent
DebtBurdent−N
to indicate whether the debt accumulation was rapid between
t-N and t. Explanatory variables other than the exchange rate regime dummies are
government budget deficit as a percentage of GDP and gross fixed capital formation
as a percentage of GDP. The results of the empirical analysis suggest that countries
with lower exchange rate flexibility accumulate debt faster and are more likely to
meet debt sustainability problems.
Our study is different from Alper and Yilmaz (2003) in a few ways. Firstly, we
have 15 countries, significantly smaller than 57 obviously. In addition, we have a
dataset on a quarterly basis from 1998 onwards while they use annual data over
1975-2000, so our dataset gives the opportunity to see the most recent impacts while
Alper and Yilmaz (2003) provides the opportunity to see the relation through a wider
time range. The reason why we use a quarterly data is that we want to differentiate
the immediate effects on external debt when there is a change in exchange rate
regime policy and investigate the short run relation rather than the long run. On
the other hand, our sample is smaller on the country basis because there is a severe
data limitation for most of the emerging countries, and also because of the fact that
countries which are in an economic policy adjustment process to join in European
Union like Bulgaria, Croatia etc. are left out of the sample to prevent a bias in
the analysis. Secondly, our dependent variable is differently defined, as “change in
external debt over nominal GDP” rather than the percentage change in debt as in
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Alper and Yilmaz (2003) because we think that evaluating the debt accumulation
with respect to the national income is more reasonable in macroeconomic terms.
Whether the increase in debt is faster or slower with respect to the increase in GDP
is an important question in emerging economies. Thirdly, our explanatory variables
have differences: Since we do not have a proper data for budget deficit, we cannot
use it as an explanatory variable. Investment over GDP is controlled for in this
study as Alper and Yilmaz (2003). On the other hand, we include real GDP growth
rate, financial openness, inflation rate, sovereign spreads as control variables which
are absent in Alper and Yilmaz (2003). Most importantly, we use the exchange
rate classification of Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) while they use the classification of
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005). They extend their analysis by using the lags
of the exchange rate dummies and average of these lag terms. In conclusion, we
reach different results. Our results indicate in general terms that fixed exchange rate
regimes lead to a decrease in external debt accumulation while their study indicates
that fixed exchange rate regimes lead to faster debt accumulation. This difference
may come from the coverage of different time periods in both analysis, different
control variables used, different classification of exchange rate regimes and different
specification of the model.
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3 Empirical Analysis
We construct the baseline model and its extended versions as a linear fixed-effects
regression model. Using the quarterly panel data, an unbalanced panel regression
analysis is conducted since we do not have complete data for all countries over the
time period we consider. The model of the baseline regression is:
Dit−Dit−1
GDPit
= αi + β ∗Xit + uit
where i is the country and t is the time subscript. The dependent variable
refers to “the change in debt over nominal GDP” as mentioned in the previous
section. Xit refers to the vector of the explanatory variables, namely the lag of real
GDP growth rate, financial openness, inflation rate, investment over GDP, lag of the
sovereign spread and the exchange rate regimes. For the real GDP growth rate and
sovereign spread, the lag terms are used in order to reduce the endogeneity problem.
Moreover, new variables are added in the robustness checks; namely, trade openness,
US 3-month deposit rate, and crisis dummies. The detailed information is given
related with the variables are given in the next section. αit captures the country
fixed effects and uit is the stochastic error term. The coefficients of the exchange
rate dummies show the effects of the specified exchange rate regime on the external
debt accumulation relative to the flexible rate regime, which is omitted. In order
to prevent a potential heteroscedasticity and serial correlation problem, we use the
t-statistics from the cluster-robust covariance matrix.
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4 The Data
We have an unbalanced dataset for 15 countries from the beginning of 1998 until
the end of 2011 on a quarterly basis. The countries are Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Egypt, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Russia, South Africa,
Thailand, Turkey and Ukraine.
External Debts and Explanatory Variables
In the empirical analysis, the external debt data for the sample countries are
derived from Quarterly external Debt Statistics (QEDS) in the World Bank. Exter-
nal debt is the sum of the debt of general government, monetary authorities, banks
and other sectors which gives an equal value of gross external debt position in the
constructed data set by World Bank. The dependent variable is Dt−Dt−1
GDPt
where D
denotes debt.
The explanatory variables used in the empirical analysis are the lag of growth
rate of real GDP, financial openness of the country, inflation rate, investment over
GDP, lag of the sovereign spread and exchange rate regimes respectively as stated in
the previous section. The growth rate of real GDP is derived from IFS dataset, it is
simply the percentage change of the GDP volume of the country. Financial openness
is the de jure index created by Chinn and Ito (2008), known as Chinn-Ito index.
As the authors explain, the index focuses on regulatory aspects of capital account
openness and it is constructed based on the IMFs Annual Report on Exchange
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). It is de jure in the sense that
it attempts to measure regulatory restrictions on capital account transactions. That
is, the legal regulations related with financial markets by governments of countries
are taken into account while constructing the index rather than the actual behaviors
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of the country. We cannot use the de facto index of Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2003)
which creates a serious endogeneity problem in our empirical analysis since it is
constructed by the ratio of assets plus liabilities of the country over its GDP. Inflation
rate is derived from IFS dataset, measured as the percentage change in the CPI.
Investment over GDP is also derived from the same dataset, which is just the value
of gross fixed capital formation over nominal GDP. As the sovereign spread data, the
Emerging Market Bond Index - Global (EMBIG) is used from J. P. Morgan. The
index of J.P. Morgan is constructed by using a sample of 33 countries on a daily
basis, the data go back as early as the beginning of 1998. The quarterly version of
it is calculated by taking the 3-month average of the daily data to be used in the
current analysis. The index measures the premium above US Treasury securities for
dollar denominated sovereign debt.
As it is widely known that, there are two main classifications of exchange rates:
de jure and de facto. De jure classification is concerned with what the countries of-
ficially declare about their exchange rate regimes and it is collected by International
Monetary Fund (IMF).The IMF’s classification scheme is an eight regime scheme
since 1998, namely; (1) Currency Union, (2) Dollarization, (3)Currency Board, (4)
Conventional Peg, (5) Crawling Peg, (6) Bands, (7) Managed Float, (8) Pure Float.
However, recently, the studies related with the choice of proper exchange rate regimes
started to see a necessity to look at what the countries actually do in practice rather
than what they declare since it is realized that countries deviate from their announce-
ment. This led to the construction of de facto exchange rate classification based on
the actual practices of the countries. Therefore, the de facto classification of exchange
rates by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) is used in the empirical analysis of the paper
as the exchange rate variable. The classification is constructed by analyzing market
determined dual and parallel exchange rates in addition to a statistical analysis of
observed behavior in the exchange rate for 153 countries over the period 1946 - 2001
(Reinhart and Rogoff (2004)). The data set is extended to the end of 2010 by Ilzet-
zki, Reinhart, and Rogoff (2008), and this latest version of the data is used in this
paper (so we call the classification as IRR classification). The quarterly version of
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the data is reproduced from the monthly coarse classification of IRR’s data set. An-
other mostly used de facto classification is the one of Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger
(2005). These authors make the classification according to the data of three vari-
ables: changes in the nominal exchange rate, the volatility of these changes and the
volatility of international reserves from all IMF reporting countries over the period
1974-2000, and four main groups of exchange rate regimes are constructed: pegged,
intermediate (crawling peg and dirty floats), flexible and inconclusive regimes. The
former classification is preferred in this paper because it gives a chance to have
significantly more observations with respect to the LYS classification which covers
the period until the end of 2004. Besides, it is more advantageous because of the
commonness of dual markets in emerging market economies (Reinhart and Rogoff
(2004)). The table of IRR classification is available at Appendix. However, we re-
classify these categories to three basic categories as fixed, intermediate and floating
regimes, respectively when constructing dummy variables.
For the first extension to the baseline model, we define two separate intermediate
exchange rate categories and use two different dummies for them. Another extension
is added to the baseline model by separating the quarters where there is a transition
from one exchange rate regime to another; and the dummies are reconstructed for
fixed exchange rate, intermediate regimes and transitional periods.
For the robustness checks of the model, two new explanatory variables; trade
openness and US 3-month deposit rate (or world interest rate) are added. Trade
openness is constructed by dividing the sum of exports and imports of a country
to its GDP. The relevant data are taken from IFS. US 3-month deposit rate is also
taken from IFS, it is used to see whether the results are affected or not according
to the movements of the world interest rate. Two crisis dummies ; one from the
paper of Kaminsky (2006) (CrisisK) which describes the chronology of currency
crises for a sample of countries and another dummy including crisis dates both from
Kaminsky (2006) and Laeven and Valencia (2008)(CrisisKLV) are included into the
model also for the robustness checks. Laeven and Valencia (2008) defines the timing
of systematic banking crises, currency crises and debt crises for a large sample of
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countries. We also add the last 2008 global crisis to this second dummy to see the
effects of all types of crises to the debt accumulation.
15
5 Results
5.0.1 Baseline Regression Results
Table 1 represents the results of the fixed-effects regression of the baseline model,
with the first column referring to the results of the original model and the remaining
ones to the robustness checks. As can be seen, the real GDP growth rate, the infla-
tion rate, the sovereign spread and the fixed exchange rate dummy have statistically
significant coefficients. Real GDP growth rate has a high positive coefficient, indi-
cating that higher growth leads to higher external debt accumulation. The rationale
behind this result can be the fact that most emerging countries finance growth by
borrowing abroad. Or, this may indicate that as countries grow, they can borrow
more easily and tolerate huger amounts of debts. Financial openness has a negative
coefficient but statistically insignificant. The result may come from the fact that
during the time period we analyze, there is not much change of the status of finan-
cial openness of the countries; as it is commonly known, the financial integration of
the most emerging economies occurred at the beginning of the 1990s. In addition,
we use a de jure financial openness index, Chinn-Ito index which may not truly re-
flect the actual behavior of the countries, so this may also lead to an insignificant
coefficient of financial openness. Inflation rate has a positive effect on debt accu-
mulation, with 1 point increase in inflation will lead to approximately 0.003 point
increase in debt accumulation. Inflation may affect debt accumulation through two
channels. Inflation can make borrowing harder for emerging economies since high
inflation indicates that the economy is “shaky” or “unhealthy”. On the other hand,
a positive relation between inflation rate and debt accumulation is compatible with
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the economic observation that countries with high inflation generally have high level
of debts, controlling for other factors. Our result shows that the second effect out-
weighs in the analysis of the current study. Sovereign spread also has a significant
positive effect on the dependent variable which is an expected result, with 1 point
increase in interest rate will lead to a 7 per cent increase in debt accumulation ap-
proximately. Investment may affect external debt through two ways. If the country
makes investment by borrowing abroad, then the external debt increases with in-
creased investment indicating a positive relationship between them. On the other
hand, if the country invests by using their own resources, then external debt de-
creases as investment increases indicating a negative relationship. Investment over
GDP has an insignificant coefficient in the current analysis. This may be the result of
the collinearity between the investment over GDP and the growth rate of real GDP.
The coefficient of the real GDP growth rate may capture the investment effect, so
the investment over GDP coefficient may become insignificant due to this fact.
Controlling for other variables, we see that fixed exchange rate dummy has a
negative coefficient of 6.5 per cent approximately. This reflects that choosing a fixed
exchange rate regime will lead to a 6.5 per cent decrease in debt accumulation with
respect to a flexible regime. In fact, fixed exchange rate regimes may affect the
debt accumulation process in a few ways. Governments cannot exploit the benefit
of seigniorage under fixed exchange rate regimes, so they may tend to borrow more
since there is not another alternative to generate revenue other than taxation. This
tendency, if it exists, will create a positive relationship between debt accumulation
and fixed regimes. On the other hand, fixed regimes may have a debt decreasing
effect in several ways. Since the large devaluations are prevented, the nominal value
of the debt is protected. If fixed regimes fulfill their duty by fixing macroeconomic
balances, they decrease the need for borrowing. Moreover, they can change the
form of capital inflow and lead to more foreign direct investment by decreasing
uncertainty or increasing the trust into the economy. The data analysis in this
study reveals a negative relationship between the fixed regimes and external debt
accumulation, so some of the latter mechanisms may occur in the process over the
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Table 5.1: Baseline Regression Results
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Real GDP growth rate 1.311*** 1.273*** 1.373*** 1.310*** 1.221***
(5.711) (5.425) (5.949) (5.703) (5.285)
Financial openness -0.007 -0.016 -0.009 -0.008 -0.007
(-0.221) (-0.429) (-0.274) (-0.240) (-0.201)
Inflation 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003**
(2.540) (2.513) (2.860) (2.520) (2.546)
Investment over GDP -0.126 -0.170 -0.131 -0.127 -0.061
(-0.320) (-0.401) (-0.334) (-0.323) (-0.173)
Trade openness 0.163
(1.288)
Sovereign spread 0.069** 0.067** 0.070** 0.070** 0.069**
(2.760) (2.754) (2.820) (2.809) (2.733)
Fixed -0.066*** -0.106*** -0.056*** -0.062*** -0.073***
(-10.389) (-3.642) (-3.406) (-9.252) (-7.513)
Intermediate 0.016 0.026 0.023 0.020 0.017
(0.680) (1.090) (0.855) (0.849) (0.673)
US interest rate -0.003
(-0.645)
Crisis-K 0.100***
(6.032)
Crisis-KLV -0.020
(-0.846)
Observations 386 386 386 386 386
R-squared 0.28 0.287 0.281 0.282 0.283
Number of groups 15 15 15 15 15
Robust t-statistics in parentheses
***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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sample. Intermediate regimes have an positive effect in a small percentage but
statistically insignificant in the regression. This indicates that there is not much
significant difference between floating or staying at an intermediate level.
The other columns remaining refer to the robustness checks with the added vari-
ables, namely trade openness, the US interest rate or world interest rate, and the
two crisis dummies. Trade openness and US interest rate have insignificant coeffi-
cients and do not cause the other parameters to change in magnitude and direction,
and statistical significance, so our results are robust to these variables. The crisis
dummy obtained by using the currency crisis dates from Kaminsky (2006) which
have a positive and highly significant coefficient, indicating approximately a 10 per
cent increase in external debt accumulation in currency crisis years. This is an ex-
pected result because in emerging countries, the currency crisis is accompanied by a
very sudden and high devaluation (depreciation) which leads to a rapid increase in
external debt in value. Moreover, we do not see a crucial change in other parameter
values and their statistical significance which means that our results are still robust.
The other crisis dummy incorporating systematic banking crisis, currency crisis and
debt crisis years from Laeven and Valencia (2008) in addition to the currency crises
from Kaminsky (2006) has not a statistically significant coefficient which means that
we do not see a crucial crisis effect when we take all kind of crises into account.
This may be the reason of the fact that banking crises and debt crises may have
a decreasing impact on debt accumulation while currency crises have the opposite
effect. In times of banking and debt crises, some amount of debt of the countries
are defaulted and also future borrowing gets harder, so there can be a canceling out
effect. On the other hand, other parameters are not much different from the initial
model meaning that the baseline model are robust to alternative modifications.
5.0.2 Extensions of The Baseline Model
Extension I: Two Separate Intermediate Dummies
In this subsection, we extend our baseline model by using two separate dummies
for intermediate regimes instead of uniting them in one dummy to see the impact of
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intermediate regimes more clearly. First intermediate dummy includes the regimes
pre-announced crawling peg, pre-announced crawling band that is narrower than or
equal to +/-2 per cent, de facto crawling peg, and de facto crawling band that is
narrower than or equal to +/-2 per cent. The second one includes pre-announced
crawling band that is wider than or equal to +/-2 per cent, de facto crawling band
that is narrower than or equal to +/-5 per cent, moving band that is narrower
than or equal to +/-2 per cent (i.e., allows for both appreciation and depreciation
over time), and managed floating. As can be seen from the tables, all explana-
tory variables including the fixed exchange rate dummy have more or less the same
coefficients and significance levels as the ones above. When we look at the inter-
mediate exchange rate dummies, we see that the first one has a highly significant
positive coefficient, approximately 15 per cent which means that the countries using
exchange rate regimes in this category face 15 per cent higher debt accumulation
when compared with the countries using flexible exchange rate regimes. The second
dummy, on the other hand, has a positive coefficient but much smaller than the
previous one and no statistical significance. This shows that soft pegs and narrow
bands show a positive relation with debt accumulation while fixed rates keep their
negative relation. It is difficult to make a comment on the coefficient of the first
intermediate dummy. We think that some of the sample countries may lead to such
a big coefficient in magnitude, i.e. 15 per cent, although the regimes in this group do
not much deviate from fixity. Therefore, to better understand the country specific
effects on this coefficient, we run regressions by excluding the countries one by one
and see that when we exclude Argentina, the results change significantly: The coef-
ficient of first intermediate group falls to 9 per cent approximately and its statistical
significance falls to 10 per cent from 1 per cent which is a more expected result with
respect to our baseline regression. This result shows that the former coefficient (15
per cent) is basically due to Argentina. Such a dominating effect of Argentina may
be related with the debt-restructuring process of her which started at the beginning
of 2005 after the 2001 Argentinean crisis. With debt-restructuring, the debt accu-
mulation process and the trend of other macroeconomic variables of Argentina may
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Table 5.2: Regression Results: Extension I
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Real GDP growth rate 1.300*** 1.264*** 1.350*** 1.299*** 1.169***
(6.419) (6.108) (6.450) (6.413) (5.720)
Financial openness 0.003 -0.005 0.002 0.003 0.005
(0.093) (-0.133) (0.050) (0.073) (0.135)
Inflation 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003**
(2.664) (2.647) (2.958) (2.644) (2.626)
Investment over GDP -0.095 -0.137 -0.098 -0.096 0.002
(-0.246) (-0.330) (-0.257) (-0.249) (0.007)
Trade openness 0.153
(1.246)
Sovereign Spread 0.067** 0.065** 0.068** 0.068** 0.067**
(2.663) (2.660) (2.719) (2.710) (2.618)
Fixed -0.068*** -0.106*** -0.060*** -0.064*** -0.078***
(-11.474) (-3.757) (-3.976) (-10.150) (-8.353)
Intermediate 1 0.148*** 0.155*** 0.152*** 0.151*** 0.157***
(10.600) (13.188) (8.418) (11.265) (12.410)
Intermediate 2 0.010 0.020 0.015 0.014 0.010
(0.437) (0.829) (0.614) (0.608) (0.415)
US interest rate -0.002
(-0.542)
CrisisK 0.098***
(6.014)
CrisisKLV -0.029
(-1.154)
Observations 386 386 386 386 386
R-squared 0.303 0.309 0.304 0.305 0.308
Number of groups 15 15 15 15 15
Robust t-statistics in parentheses
***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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have changed significantly, and this may be the reason of such a high-valued and
statistically much significant coefficient of first intermediate group. On the other
hand, wide bands and managed float regimes do not differ from the flexible ones in
terms of debt accumulation.
Robustness checks also give the same results above; trade openness, US interest
rate and second crisis dummy have insignificant coefficients as well as leaving the
other parameters almost unaffected in the model. The first crisis dummy(CrisisK)
has a significant and positive coefficient again here indicating that currency crises
lead to an approximate 10 per cent increase in debt accumulation.
Extension II: Transitional Periods
In this subsection, we investigate the effect of making a transition in the exchange
rate policy. We will reorganize the exchange rate dummies of the baseline model by
separating the quarters in which there is a transition from one regime to another and
creating a dummy for these periods. As can be seen from the table 3, all explanatory
variables other than the exchange rate regime dummies have coefficients in the same
direction with the baseline model and also more or less in the same magnitude.
Fixed exchange rates again lead to a decrease in debt accumulation, in an amount
of 7.2 per cent approximately. Intermediate exchange rate dummy has a positive
but insignificant coefficient again; however, the transitional dummy has a positive
coefficient at 10 percentage significance, indicating that transitional periods lead to
a 12 per cent increase in debt accumulation. This can be due to the uncertainty in
the economy stemming from a macroeconomic policy change.
Robustness check give the same results with the previous sections except with
the regression with the trade openness. As can be seen from the second column of
the table 3, trade openness gains significance in statistical terms while transitional
dummy loses it. In this regression, it seems that one point increase in trade openness
leads to a 20 per cent increase in debt accumulation while transitional periods have a
coefficient near to its counterpart in the first column in magnitude, but statistically
insignificant. Therefore, except this one, our extended model also passes robustness
tests. Dummy for currency crises(CrisisK) indicates again nearly a 10 per cent
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Table 5.3: Regression Results: Extension II
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Real GDP growth rate 1.305*** 1.257*** 1.376*** 1.304*** 1.199***
(5.696) (5.432) (5.914) (5.688) (5.193)
Financial openness -0.010 -0.022 -0.013 -0.011 -0.010
(-0.346) (-0.735) (-0.420) (-0.374) (-0.311)
Inflation 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003**
(2.514) (2.470) (2.845) (2.492) (2.511)
Investment over GDP -0.136 -0.194 -0.141 -0.137 -0.061
(-0.346) (-0.451) (-0.361) (-0.349) (-0.174)
Trade openness 0.206*
(1.843)
Sovereign spread 0.070** 0.067** 0.070** 0.071** 0.070**
(2.786) (2.718) (2.856) (2.840) (2.755)
Fixed (transitional) -0.072*** -0.124*** -0.062*** -0.068*** -0.082***
(-9.094) (-4.401) (-3.693) (-8.427) (-5.886)
Intermediate (transitional) 0.019 0.034 0.025 0.023 0.017
(0.723) (1.582) (0.885) (0.894) (0.628)
Transitional dummy 0.124* 0.154 0.130* 0.127* 0.131*
(1.857) (1.758) (1.956) (1.928) (1.998)
US interest rate -0.003
(-0.751)
CrisisK 0.105***
(6.239)
CrisisKLV -0.023
(-0.973)
Observations 386 386 386 386 386
R-squared 0.288 0.298 0.29 0.29 0.291
Number of groups 15 15 15 15 15
Robust t-statistics in parentheses
***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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increase in debt accumulation during the times of currency crises.
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6 Conclusion
The analysis of this thesis aims to shed light on the relationship between the exchange
rate regime behavior of emerging countries and their external debt accumulation.
The results of the empirical analysis show that choosing a fixed exchange rate regime
in de facto terms leads to a slower debt accumulation relative to flexible exchange
rate regimes.On the other hand, in the first extension of the baseline model, we see
a positive impact of the relatively soft pegs and narrow bands on debt accumulation
as the first group of intermediate regimes while the second group including more
wider bands and managed floats do not seem to have a significant impact on debt
accumulation compared with the freely floats. However, when we leave Argentina out
of the sample, we see that the positive effect of the first group decreases in magnitude
and also its statistical significance falls substantially. Moreover, switching from one
regime to another has a cost over the debt accumulation. Lastly, currency crises
have debt increasing effect in emerging economies as a natural realization of the
economic expectation since currency crises in those economies mean sudden and
large devaluations (or depreciations).
As the results show that fixed exchange rate regimes lead to slower debt accu-
mulation, we can conclude that keeping the exchange rate fixed can help emerging
economies in maintaining a low debt level and avoiding solvency problems. However,
slower debt accumulation can also be viewed as a deliberate policy choice since keep-
ing the debt level under control reduces the possibility of a financial crisis, which
may be viewed as more likely under fixed exchange rate regimes. The reasons behind
this result merit further investigation and should be the subject of future research.
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7 Appendix
Table 7.1: The Ilzetski-Reinhart-Rogoff classification of de facto exchange rates
The coarse classification codes: The fine classification codes:
1
1 No separate legal tender
2 Pre announced peg or currency board arrangement
3 Pre announced horizontal band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2%
4 De facto peg
2
5 Pre announced crawling peg
6 Pre announced crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2%
7 De factor crawling peg
8 De facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2%
3
9 Pre announced crawling band that is wider than or equal to +/-2%
10 De facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-5%
11 Moving band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2%
(i.e., allows for both appreciation and depreciation over time)
12 Managed floating
4 13 Freely floating
5 14 Freely falling 1
6 15 Dual market in which parallel market data is missing.
1Freely falling: The authors define this category for the case where the country’s annual inflation
is greater than or equal to 40 per cent and when in these episodes of inflation, there is no official
announcement of the exchange rate regimes by the authority. Also, they use this category during
the six months immediately after a currency crisis, but only for those cases where there is a sudden
transition from a fixed regime to a managed or independently floating regime.
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Table 7.2: Reclassification of IRR classification in the current analysis:
Fixed
No separate legal tender
Pre announced peg or currency board arrangement
Pre announced horizontal band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2%
De facto peg
Intermediate
Pre announced crawling peg
Pre announced crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2%
De factor crawling peg
De facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2%
Pre announced crawling band that is wider than or equal to +/-2%
De facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-5%
Moving band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2%
(i.e., allows for both appreciation and depreciation over time)
Managed floating
Flexible Freely floating
Intermediate 1
Pre announced crawling peg
Pre announced crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2%
De factor crawling peg
De facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2%
Intermediate 2
Pre announced crawling band that is wider than or equal to +/-2%
De facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-5%
Moving band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2%
(i.e., allows for both appreciation and depreciation over time)
Managed floating
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Data Sources and Definitions
• External debt : World Bank Quarterly External Debt Statistics Database.
• Real GDP growth rate: Quarterly growth rate of real GDP. Real GDP data
from IMF’s International Financial Statistics database (IFS).
• Inflation rate: Quarterly inflation rate measured by CPI, from IFS.
• Financial openness : De jure financial openness index by Chinn and Ito (2008).
• Sovereign spread : Emerging Markets Bond Index Global (EMBIG), J.P. Mor-
gan. Quarterly data are obtained by taking averages of daily data.
• Investment : Gross fixed capital formation, IFS.
• Trade openness : Exports plus imports over nominal GDP. Export, import and
GDP data from IFS.
• US interest rate: Three-month US deposit rate, IFS.
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Table 7.3: Percentage of exchange rate regime observations in each category
Fixed Intermediate Flexible Intermediate
1
Intermediate
2
Percentage 18.6 69.0 12.4 18.1 50.9
Table 7.4: Summary Statistics for other explanatory variables
Financial
openness
Real
GDP
growth
rate
Inflation Investment
over GDP
Trade
openness
US inter-
est rate
Sovereign
spread
Mean 0.252 0.037 9.486 0.210 0.523 3.264 2.764
Std. Dev. 1.280 0.048 14.585 0.044 0.443 2.112 1.739
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